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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
THE 1986-1987 TERM (PART II) 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law and Criminal Justice 
Case Western Reserve University 
This the second of a two-part article on the Supreme 
Court's criminal procedure cases decided this Term. 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
For the first time, the Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of preventive detention in a criminal trial. 
United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987). The Bail 
Reform Act of 1984 permits a federal court to detain an 
arrestee pending trial if the prosecution demonstrates by 
clear and convincing evidence, after an adversary hear-
ing, that no release conditions "will reasonably assure 
... the safety of any other person and the community." 
The Second Circuit had found this provision facially 
unconstitutional as violative of "substantive due proc-
ess." United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986). 
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court first addres-
sed the substantive due process issue, i.e., whether 
preventive detention authorizes impermissible punish-
ment before trial. This argument depends on whether 
preventive detention is punitive or regulatory. The Court 
ruled that Congress intended preventive detention to be 
regulatory, a purpose it found to be legitimate: "There is 
no doubt that preventing danger to the community is a 
legitimate regulatory goal." /d. at 2101. In addition, pre-
ventive detention was not excessive in relation to this 
regulatory goal because the Bail Reform Act carefully 
limits the circumstances under which detention may be 
sought to the most serious crimes- crimes of violence, 
offenses for which the sentence is life imprisonment or 
death, serious drug offenses, or certain repeat offenders. 
Moreover, the arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention 
hearing, and the maximum length of detention is limited. 
The Court also believed that the procedural safeguards 
required by the Bail Reform Act supported its holding: 
Detainees have the right to counsel at the detention 
hearing ... They may testify in their own behalf, pres-
ent information by proffer or otherwise, and cmss-
examine witnesses who appear at the hearing .. .The 
judicial officer charged with the responsibility of deter-
mining the appropriateness of detention is guided by 
statutorily enumerated factors, which include the 
nature and the circumstances of the charges, the 
weight of the evidence, the history and characteristics 
of the putative offender, and the danger to the commu-
nity ... The government must prove its case by clear 
and convincing evidence ... Finally, the judicial officer 
must include written findings of fact and a written state-
ment of reasons for a decision to detain ... The Act's 
review provisions ... provide for immediate appellate 
review of the detention decision. /d. at 2104. 
The Court next considered an Eighth Amendment 
argument, i.e., whether the Act violated the Excessive 
Bail Clause. According to the Court, the Clause says 
nothing about whether bail must be available; it only 
proscribes excessive bail. The right to bail is not abso-
lute. For example, a court may refuse bail in capital cases 
or when the defendant presents a threat to the judicial 
process by intimidating witnesses. While the Court 
acknowledged that the primary function of bail is to safe-
guard the court's role in adjudicating guilt or innocence, 
it rejected "the proposition that the Eighth Amendment 
categorically prohibits the government from pursuing 
other admittedly compelling interests through the regula-
tion of pretrial release." /d. at 2104. 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 107 S.Ct. 1990 (1987), involved 
the right to counsel when a conviction is challenged in a 
collateral proceeding. In particular, Finley concerned the 
application of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
Anders held that when an attorney appointed to repre-
sent an indigent defendant on direct appeal finds a case 
wholly frivolous: 
[H]e should so advise the court and request permis-
sion to withdraw. That request must, however, be 
accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the 
record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy 
of counsel's brief should be furnished the indigent and 
time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; 
the court-not counsel-then proceeds, after a full 
examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether 
the case is wholly frivolous. /d. at 744. 
)ublic Defender Hyman Friedman 
~uyahoga County Public Defender Office, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
Telephone (216) 443-7223 
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The Supreme Court, however, has·never-heldthat 
prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when 
mounting a collateral attack. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 
483, 488 (1969). The Court's cases establish that the 
right to appointed counsel extends only to the first appeal 
of right. For example, it does not extend to discretionary 
appeals. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). Thus, even 
though the State had provided a right to counsel in col-
lateral proceedings as a matter of state law, the federal 
Constitution, according to the Court in Finley, does not 
"dictate the exact form such assistance must assume." 
107 S.Ct at 1995. Accordingly, the strict procedural guide-
lines of Anders were not applicable. 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
Martin v. Ohio, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (1987}, involved the 
constitutionality of allocating the burden of persuasion 
on self-defense to the defendant. Martin was charged 
with aggravated murder and pleaded self-defense. An 
Ohio statute provided: "The burden of going forward with 
the evidence ofari affirmative defense, and the burden of 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirma-
tive defense, is upon the accused." R.C. § 2901.05(A). 
Under Ohio law, self-defense is an affirmative defense, 
and the trial court instructed the jury accordingly. Martin 
argued that placing on her the burden of proving self-
defense violated the Due Process Clause. 
On review, the Supreme Court rejected this argument. 
In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), thf3 Court had 
declared that the Due Process Clause "protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute 
the crime with which he is charged."ld. at 364. In Patter-
son v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977}, the Court ruled that 
Winship was not violated where. the state was required to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements 
of murder, but placed on the defendant the burden of 
proving the affirmative defense of extreme emotional 
disturbance, which reduced murder to manslaughter. 
According to the Court, Patterson controlled. The jury 
had been instructed that the prosecution had to establish 
the essential elements of aggravated murder beyond a 
reasonable doubt. An affirmative defense, whether self-
defense or insanity, is not an essential element of the 
charged crime and, thus, the burden of persuasion could 
be allocated to the defendant. It did not matter that only 
Ohio and South Carolina had chosen to allocate this 
burden to the defendant. 
HYPNOTICALLY-REFRESHED TESTIMONY 
Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S.Ct. 2704 (1987), involved the 
admissibility of testimony of a defendant whose memory 
had been refreshed through hypnosis. Rock was 
charged with the death of her husband. She told the 
police that her husband had attacked her, at which time 
she had picked up a gun. When he hit her again, she 
shot him. Because she could not remember the precise 
details of the incident, her attorney suggested that she 
submit to hypnosis. After hypnosis, she recalled that she 
did not have her finger on the trigger at the time the 
weapon discharged. She also recalled that the weapon 
fired when her husband grabbed her. Based on this infor-
mation, her attorney had the gun examined by a firearms 
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expert, who concluded that the gun was defective and 
prone to fire, when hit or dropped, without the trigger 
being pulled. The trial court excluded her testimony 
because she had been hypnotized, a ruling that was 
upheld by the Arkansas Supreme Court. Rock's appeal 
focused on her right to testify in her own behalf. 
On review, the Supreme Court agreed with Rock's 
contention and reversed. The Court began its analysis by 
recognizing a right to testify. "At this point in the develop-
ment of our adversary system, it cannot be doubted that 
a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the 
witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense." /d. 
at 2708. This right is based on due process, the right of 
compulsory process, the right to counsel, and the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Although the Court 
recognized the problems associated with hypnotically-
refreshed testimony, it found the Arkansas per se rule of 
inadmissibility to be an arbitrary restriction on the defen-
dant's righUo testify. A less restrictive approach, howev-
er, might have satisfied constitutional guarantees: "The 
State would be well within its powers if it established 
guidelines to aid trial courts in the evaluation of posthyp-
nosis testimony and it may be able to show that testimo-
ny in a particular case is so unreliable that exclusion is 
justified." /d. at 2714. 
IMPEACHMENT OF VERDICTS 
The defendants in Tanner v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 
2739(1987), were convicted of mail fraud and conspiracy 
to defraud the United States. After the verdict, the 
defense counsel received an unsolicited telephone call 
from a juror, who stated that several of the jurors con-
sumed alcohol during the lunch breaks, which caused 
them to sleep through the afternoons. In a post-verdict 
hearing, the trial court refused to admit the testimony 
concerning juror intoxication. A later affidavit by a 
second juror described further episodes of intoxication 
as well as marijuana and cocaine use. The defendants 
argued that the trial court's action violated Federal 
Evidence Rule 606(b) and the right to trial by jury. 
The Supreme Court disagreed. By the turn of the 
century, the firmly established common law rule flatly 
prohibited the admission of juror testimony to impeach a 
verdict. The rule was intended to encourage freedom of 
deliberation, finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors 
against harassment. An exception for situations of 
"extraneous influence," however, was eventually recog-
nized. Thus, a juror could testify about the reading of 
prejudicial newspaper accounts in the juryroom. In 
contrast, misunderstandings about jury instructions were 
considered "internal" to the jury deliberation process 
and thus not subject to juror testimony. The external-
internal distinction is codified in Federal Rule 606(b}. 
According to the Court, the legislative history of this rule 
clearly established that juror drunkenness was not 
considered an external influence. In addition, the Court 
found that the allegations about juror intoxication did not 
violate the defendants' right to trial by an impartial and 
competent jury. 
RELEASE-DISMISSAL AGREEMENTS 
Bernard Rumery was charged with tampering with a 
witness. The charges arose from Rumery's conversa-
tions with a woman who had allegedly been sexually 
assaulted by a friend of Rumery. The substance of the 
conversations was disputed, and Rumery's attorney told 
_ the prosecutor that if the charges were not dismissed, 
1 Rumery would win the case and then sue. The prosecu-
" tor and Rumery subsequently entered into an agreement 
under which the charges would be dropped and Rumery 
would release any claims he had against the town, its 
officials, or the victim. Although the charges were drop-
ped pursuant to this agreement, Rumery brought a § 
1983 action against the town and its officials, alleging a 
violation of his constitutional rights. Relying on the 
release-dismissal agreement, the defendants moved to 
dismiss the suit. Rumery argued that the agreement was 
against public policy. The First Circuit accepted this 
argument and adopted a per se rule invalidating release-
dismissal agreements. 
On review, the Supreme Court reversed: "[A]Ithough 
we agree that in some cases these agreements may 
infringe important interests of the criminal defendant and 
of society as a whole, we do not believe that the mere 
possibility of harm to these interests calls for a per se 
rule." Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S.Ct. 1187, 1192 
(1987). First, such agreements are not inherently coer-
cive. Criminal defendants are often required to make diffi-
cult choices that effectively waive constitutional rights. 
Plea bargaining is an example. At the time he signed the 
agreement, Rumery was not in jail and was represented 
by counsel. He waited three days to make a decision. 
Second, while such agreements may tempt prosecutors 
to bring frivolous charges in reaction to a civil rights 
. claim, this possibility should not lead to the prohibition of 
/ all release-dismissal agreements. Finally, the prosecutor 
offered a valid reason for entering into the agreement-
to protect the alleged victim from the public scrutiny and 
embarrassment she would have endured if she had had 
to testify in the criminal and civil cases. The Court wrote: 
In sum, we conclude that this agreement was volun-
tary, that there is no evidence of prosecutorial miscon-
duct, and that enforcement of this agreement would 
not adversely affect the relevant public interests. /d. at 
1195. 
Justice O'Connor, who cast the decisive vote, wrote a 
concurring opinion. She agreed that a case-by-case 
approach, rather than a per se rule, was appropriate in 
this context. Her disagreement with the Court is summa-
rized in the following passage: 
The defendants in a§ 1983 suit may establish that a 
particular release executed in exchange for the 
dismissal of criminal charges was voluntarily made, 
not the product of prosecutorial overreaching, and in 
the public interest. But they must prove that this is so; 
the courts should not presume it as I fear portions of 
... the Court's opinion may imply. /d. at 1197. 
DISCOVERY 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107 S.Ct. 989 (1987), involved 
a criminal defendant's right of access to confidential files. 
·, Ritchie was charged with the sexual assault of his 
' 13-year-old daughter. The Children and Youth Services 
(CYS), a protective service agency, investigated the inci-
dent. During pretrial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a 
subpoena seeking access to the records concerning his 
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daughter. CYS claimed the records were privileged under 
state law, and the trial court refused to order disclosure. 
Ritchie was convicted and appealed. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court ruled that the Confrontation and Compul-
sory Process Clauses required full access to the records. 
On review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, re-
versed in part, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Ritchie claimed that denying him access to the 
records interfered with his right to cross-examine his 
daughter at trial. A plurality of the Court rejected this 
argument: 
The opinions of this Court show that the right of 
confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent 
improper restrictions on the types of questions that 
defense counsel may ask during cross-examination 
... The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, 
does not include the power to require the pretrial 
disclosure of any and all information that might be 
useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony. Normal-
ly the right to confront one's accusers is satisfied if 
defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial toques-
tion witnesses. /d. at 999. 
In addition, the Court preferred to evaluate Ritchie's 
claim under a due process, rather than a compulsory 
process, analysis. Due process requires the prosecution 
to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favora-
ble to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. 
"Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable proba-
bility that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 
(1985). Although the state's interest in confidentiality is 
strong, this interest does not necessarily mean that 
disclosure should be precluded in all circumstances. If 
material to a criminal defendant's defense, the records 
should be disclosed. Consequently, the case was 
remanded: "Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file 
reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it 
contains information that probably would have changed 
the outcome of his trial." 107 S.Ct. at 1002. 
The Court, however, did not believe that the defense 
attorney had a right to examine the records. The defen-
dant's interest in a fair trial can be protected by an in 
camera review by the trial court. Full disclosure to the 
defense would "sacrifice unnecessarily the Common-
wealth's compelling interest in protecting its child abuse 
information:' /d. at 1003. 
Justice Blackmun, who cast the decisive vote, wrote a 
concurring opinion. He disagreed that the Confrontation 
Clause protects only trial rights and has no relevance to 
pretrial discovery: "In my view, there might well be a 
confrontation violation if, as here, a defendant is denied 
pretrial access to information that would make possible 
effective cross-examination of a crucial prosecution 
witness." /d. at 1004. 
DEATH PENALTY 
Mandatory Capital Punishment 
The Court examined the constitutionality of mandatory 
capital punishment in Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S.Ct. 2716 
(1987). Shuman was sentenced under a statute that 
mandated the death penalty for a prison inmate who is 
convicted ofmurder while serving a life sentence without 
the possibility of parole. In prior cases the Court had 
reserved judgment on this issue. 
In Shuman the Court gave its answer. Mandatory death 
sentences violate the Eighth Amendment proscription 
against cruel and unusual punishment. The statute was 
deficient for two reasons. First, it precluded the consider-
ation of any mitigating circumstances, about either the 
prison murder or the predicate offense which resulted in 
the life-term. "Without consideration of the nature of the 
predicate life-term offense and the circumstances 
surrounding the commission of that offense, the label 
'life-term inmate' reveals little about the inmate's record 
or character." /d. at 2725. 
Second, a mandatory capital-sentencing procedure 
does not necessarily increase deterrence. Even without a 
mandatory penalty, an inmate convicted of a prison mur-
der runs the risk that the death penalty will be imposed 
under the State's guided-discretion capital statute. 
Accomplice Liability 
Tison v. Arizona, 107 S.Ct. 1676 (1987), involved the 
constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on defen-
dants who neither intended to kill the victims nor inflicted 
the fatal wounds. Gary Tison was serving a life sentence 
for murder when his three sons helped him and a cell-
mate, another convicted murderer, escape. Later, they 
flagged down a passing car. The occupants included a 
father, mother, two-year old son, and a niece. Tison and 
the cellmate killed all four. His sons were apparently 
surprised by the shootings. One son died in a roadblock 
shootout, and Gary Tison escaped into the desert where 
he subsequently died of exposure. The cellmate and two 
remaining sons were tried on capital charges. Convicted 
under accomplice liability andfelony"murder statutes, 
each defendant was subsequently sentenced to death 
and appealed. 
The focus of the appeal was the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). In that 
case the Court had reversed a death sentence imposed 
under Florida's felony-murder rule. Enmund had been 
the getaway driver in an armed robbery of a dwelling. His 
accomplice had killed an elderly couple when they resist-
ed the robbery. The Court found the death penalty dis-
proportionate to the crime of robbery-felony murder in 
these circumstances, because Enmund's participation in 
the murders was too tangential. The Court did not 
believe that "the threat that the death penalty will be 
imposed for murder will measurably deter one who does 
not kill and has no intention or purpose that life will be 
taken." /d. at 798-99. 
The Tison brothers argued that Enmund controlled. 
The Supreme Court disagreed. According to the Court, 
that case concerned only the two extremes. At one pole 
was someone like Enmund who was a minor actor, not at 
the scene, and who neither intended to kill nor was found 
to have had any culpable mental state. At the other pole 
was the felony-murderer who actually killed or intended 
to kill. The Tison brothers' cases fell somewhere 
between these two poles. In determining whether the 
death penalty was proportional for killings that fell 
between these extremes, the Court focused on two 
factors: first, the degree of participation in the felony, and 
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second, the culpable mental state. As for the requisite 
mental state, the Court found "intent to kill" a too restric-
tive criterion. '[R]eckless indifference to the value of 
human life may be every bit as shocking to the moral 
sense as an 'intent to kill.' " 107 S.Ct. at 1688. Accordingly, · 
·~major participation in the felony committed, combined 
with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to 
satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement." /d. 
Racial Discrimination 
The defendant in McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S.Ct. 1756 
(19"a7), challenged the imposition of his death sentence 
based on a statistical study that showed that the death 
penalty was imposed in Georgia more often on black 
defendants and killers of white victims than on white 
defendants and killers of black victims. The study exam-
ined over 2,000 murder cases that occurred during the 
1970s. "The raw numbers ... indicate that defendants 
charged with killing white persons received the death 
penalty in 11% of the cases, but defendants charge_d with 
killing blacks received the death penalty in only 1% of the 
cases." /d. at 1763. When the race of the victim and the 
race of the defendant were considered together, the 
study showed the following: 
[T]he death penalty was assessed in 22% of the cases 
involving black defendants and white victims; 8% of 
the cases involving white defendants and white 
victims; 1% of the cases involving black defendants 
and black victims; and 3% of the cases involving white 
defendants and black victims. /d. 
Based on this study, McCleskey challenged his sen-
tence on equal protection, as well as cruel and unusual 
punishment, grounds. The Supreme Court rejected both. 
The Court began its equal protection analysis by noting 
that the defendant had to prove a discriminatory purpose 
in his case. He offered no specific evidence of such. 
Instead, he relied solely on the statistical study. Although 
the Court had relied on statistical evidence in other 
areas, such as jury selection, it believed that the nature 
of the capital sentencing decision was different: "Each 
jury is unique in its composition, and the Constitution 
requires that its decision rest on consideration of in-
numerable factors that vary according to the characteris-
tics of the individual defendant and the facts of the 
particular capital offense." /d. at 1767. Moreoyer, the 
Court viewed discretion as an integral part of the 
sentencing system and thus demanded stronger 
evidence than that provided by the statistical study: 
Implementation of these [murder] laws necessarily 
requires discretionary judgments. Because discretion 
is essential to the criminal justice process, we would 
demand exceptionally clear proof before we would 
infer that the discretion has been abused. The unique 
nature of the decisions at issue in this case also coun-
sel against adopting such an inference from the 
disparities indicated by the [statistical] study. Accord- · 
ingly, we hold that the ... study is clearly insufficient 
to support an inference that any of the decision makers 
in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory 
purpose. /d. at 1769. 
Next, the Court considered McCleskey's Eighth 
Amendment argument- that the Georgia system was 
arbitrary and capricious in its application due to the 
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influence of racial considerations. Again, the Court re-
jected his argument. The Court first noted the safeguards 
against racial prejudice that it had required in the jury 
selection process. It also emphasized once more the role 
of discretion and its value to defendants in the criminal 
justice system. Measured against these protections and 
values, the statistical study prove insufficient: 
In light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial 
bias in the process, the fundamental value of jury trial 
in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that 
discretion provides to criminal defendants, we hold 
that the ... study does not demonstrate a constitu-
tionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Geor-
gia capital-sentencing process. /d. at 1778. 
Mitigating Circumstances 
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has held that 
the sentencer in a capital case "may not refuse to con-
sider or be precluded from considering 'any relevant 
mitigating evidence.'" Skipper v. South Carolina, 106 
S.Ct. 1669, 1671 (1986) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982)(plurality opinion). The issue 
again came before the Court in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 107 
S.Ct. 1821 (1987). At the sentencing phase of trial, the 
defendant introduced evidence of his family background 
and capacity for rehabilitation. The Florida statute in 
effect at the time, however, listed specific mitigating 
factors. The judge's instruction to an advisory jury indi-
cated that only those factors were relevant. Since the 
judge refused to consider the evidence of nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances, the Court reversed the death 
sentence. 
Victim Impact Statements 
Booth v. Maryland, 107 S.Ct. 2529 (1987), presented 
the question whether the Constitution prohibits a jury 
from considering a "victim impact statement" (VIS) 
during capital sentencing proceedings. The Court held 
that it did. 
Booth was convicted of first-degree murder in the 
deaths of an elderly couple. Under Maryland statutory 
law, the VIS is part of the presentence report and may be 
read to the jury during the sentencing phase of a trial. 
The VIS in Booth's case was based on interviews with the 
victims' son, daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter. 
Parts of the VIS emphasized the victims' outstanding 
personal qualities. Other parts disclosed the severe 
emotional and personal problems the family members 
had faced as a result of the crime. The VIS was read to 
the jury, and they sentenced Booth to death. 
The Court ruled that the information in the VIS was 
irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision, and that its 
admissibility created the risk that the death penalty 
would be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously. In carrying 
out its task, "the jury is required to focus on the defen-
dant as a uniquely individual human bein[g]." Woodson 
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). The VIS, 
however, focuses on the victim and the effect of the crime 
on his family, factors that may be wholly unrelated to the 
blameworthiness of the particular defendant. 
Allowing the jury to rely on a VIS therefore could result 
in imposing the death sentence because of factors 
about which the defendant was unaware, and that 
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were irrelevant to the decision to kill. This evidence 
thus could divert the jury's attention away from the 
defendant's background and record, and the circum-
stances of the crime. 107 S.Ct. at 2534. 
In addition, the VIS introduces an arbitrary element into 
the decision-making process. The relatives in Booth were 
articulate in expressing their grief. Other victims, howev-
er, may not leave behind any relatives, or the family 
members may be inarticulate. "The fact that the imposi-
tion of the death sentence may turn on such distinctions 
illustrates the danger of allowing juries to consider this 
information." /d. Finally, the Court was concerned how 
the defendant might rebut such evidence; the Court 
feared a mini-trial on the victim's character, which would 
distract the jury from its central task. 
Sympathy Instruction 
The defendant in California v. Brown, 107 S.Ct. 837 
(1987), challenged a jury instruction on sympathy, which 
was given during the penalty phase of his capital case. 
Brown was found guilty of rape and first degree murder. 
In the penalty phase, the prosecution presented 
evidence that the defendant had raped another girl on a 
prior occasion. The defense presented family members 
and a psychiatrist. The trial court instructed the jury to 
consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
and to weigh them in determining the appropriate penal-
ty. The court also cautioned the jury that it "must not be 
swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, 
passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." 
Brown was sentenced to death. The California Supreme 
Court reversed on constitutional grounds. 
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. Accord-
ing to the Court, its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
established two prerequisites to the imposition of the 
death penalty. First, sentencers may not be given unbri-
dled discretion in imposing capital punishment. See 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Second, a capital 
defendant generally must be allowed to introduce any 
relevant mitigating evidence regarding his character, 
record, or the circumstances of the offense. See Eddings 
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). The Court held that the 
"instruction given by the trial court in this case violates 
neither of these constitutional principles." 107 S.Ct. at 839. 
The Court believed that the California Supreme Court 
had improperly focused solely on the word "sympathy." 
The instruction cautioned against being swayed by 
"mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, preju-
dice, public opinion or public feeling." The Court 
believed that reasonable jurors would not focus only on 
the phrase "mere sympathy:• and if they did, they "would 
likely interpret the phrase as an admonition to ignore 
emotional responses that are not rooted in the aggravat-
ing and mitigating evidence introduced during the penal-
ty phase." /d. at 840. The Court added: 
An instruction prohibiting juries from basing their 
sentencing decisions on factors not presented at the 
trial, and irrelevant to the issues at the trial, does not 
violate the United States Constitution. It serves the 
useful purpose of confining the jury's imposition of the 
death sentence by cautioning it against reliance on 
extraneous emotional factors, which, we think, would 
be farmore likely to turn the jury against a capital 
defendant than for him. /d. 
Death-Qualified Juries 
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the 
Court held that a capital defendant's right to an impartial 
jury under the Sixth Amendment prohibited the exclusion 
of venire members "simply because they voiced general 
objections to the death penalty or expressed conscien-
tious or religious scruples against its infliction." /d. at 
522. Exclusion shoJ.Jid be3 limited only to those who were 
"irrevocably committed ... to vote agalnsfi~e-death 
penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances that 
might emerge in the course of the proceedings," and to 
those whose views would prevent them from making an 
impartial decision on the question of guilt/d. at 522 n.21. 
See also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). In Davis 
v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976), the Court held that when 
a trial court misapplies Witherspoon and excludes from a 
capital jury a prospective juror who in fact is qualified to 
serve, a death sentence imposed by that jury cannot 
stand. Gray v. Mississippi, 107 S.Ct. 2045 (1987), present-
ed the question whether Davis should be abandoned in 
favor of a harmless-error analysis. The Court reaffirmed 
Davis, again rejecting a harmless-error analysis in this 
context: 
Because the Witherspoon-Witt standard is rooted in the 
constitutional right to an impartial jury, ... and because 
the impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very 
integrity of the legal system, the ... harmless- error 
analysis can,ot apply. We have recognized that "some 
constitutional rights.[are] so basic to a fair trial that 
their infraction can never be treated as harmless 
error." ... The righUOJ~Dl1JJPfll1i§l<!qjycjic~tor, be it 
judge or jury, is such a right. /d. at 2056-57. 
Buchanan v. Kentucky, 107 S.Ct. 2906 (1987}, also 
focused on death-qualified juries. Buchanan, along with 
an accomplice, was charged with capital murder. They 
were tried together. The trial court granted a defense 
motion to dismiss the capital portion of the indictment 
because Buchanan was not the triggerman and had not 
intended to kill. Both defendants were convicted; the 
codefendant received the death penalty. Buchanan 
claimed that trial by a death-qualified jury deprived him 
of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury selected 
from a fair cross-section of the community. 
The Supreme Court disagreed. According to the Court, 
Buchanan's claim was foreclosed by Lockhart v. McCree, 
106 S.Ct. 1758 (1986}, in which the Court had held that 
"death qualification" prior to the guilt phase of the trial 
did not violate the fair cross-section requirement. That 
requirement applied only to venires, not to petit juries. 
Moreover, "Witherspoon-excludables" did not constitute 
a distinctive group for fair cross-section purposes. In 
sum, McCree concluded that "the Constitution presup-
poses that a jury selected from a fair cross section of the 
community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individu-
al viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as 
the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out 
their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the partie-
6 
ular case." /d. at 1770. 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
Broken Plea Agreement E 
The defendant in Ricketts v. Adamson, 107 S.Ct. 2680 
(1987}, was charged with first degree murder in the death 
of Donald Bolles, a reporter for the Arizona Republican. 
He pleaded guilty to second degree murder pursuant to a 
plea bargain, in which he agreed to testify against two 
other defendants. The agreement provided that "[s]hould 
the defendant refuse to testify or should he at any time 
tesfityunlrutnflilly ... then this entire agreement is null 
and void and the original charge will be automatically 
reinstated:' The trial court accepted the plea but with-
held sentencing. Adamson testified against the other · 
defendants, who were convicted of first degree murder. 
He was then sentenced. The convictions of the other 
defendants, however, were reversed on appeal, and 
Adamson refused to testify at the retrial. He claimed that 
his obligation to testify under the agreement ended when 
he was sentenced. The prosecution considered his 
refusal to testify as a breach of the agreement, and 
Adamson was subsequently tried, convicted of first 
degree murder, and sentenced to death. In a federal 
habeas proceeding, the federal appellate court ruled that 
his double jeopardy rights had been violated. 
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court acknow-
ledged that absent special circumstances, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause would bar prosecution for first degree 
murder because second degree murder was a lesser 
included offense. According to the Court, the special ~ 
circumstances were Adamson's waiver of his double 
jeopardy claim. The Court believed the agreement was 
clear; should Adamson not testify after pleading guilty to 
second degl'eemurder, the agreement was void, and he 
could be tried for first degree murder. This agreement 
necessarily involves a waiver of double jeopardy rights. 
Reversal After Appeal 
Montana v. Hall, 107 S.Ct. 1825 (1987), involved a retrial 
after a successful appeal. Hall was convicted of incest of 
his stepdaughter and appealed. During the appellate 
process, the State discovered that the incest statute had 
not applied to stepchildren at the time of the crime. An 
amendment, which included stepchildren, became effec-
tive three months after the incident in question. The State 
brought the issue to the attention of the Montana Supreme 
Court, which reversed Hall's conviction on ex post facto 
grounds. The court also concluded that a retrial for sexu-
al assault was precluded because incest and sexual 
assault were the "same offense" for double jeopardy 
purposes. 
On review the Supreme Court reversed per curiam. 
Under the Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence, the 
successful appeal of a judgment of conviction, on any 
ground other than the sufficiency of the evidence, does 
not bar further proceedings for the same offense. Since 
Hall's conviction was reversed on ex post facto grounds, 
rather than for insufficient evidence, a retrial on the sexu-
al assault charge was permissible. 
